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In cloud computing systems with huge volumes of data, fault tolerance is of critical 
importance. To enhance data fault tolerance in cloud systems, we introduce a new group- 
based data backup and recovery scheme in this paper. The new scheme performs efficient 
diskless checkpointing practices to maintain data correctness via alternative processors 
upon processor failure. The basic idea is to place six processors in a transmission group, 
with each processor sending data to only two member processors. In face of processor 
failure, such a practice helps reduce the needed data backup volume and recovery time, 
and reaches up to 3/6 fault-tolerance ratios. Our scheme attains the performance gain 
mainly because (1) it allows a processor to receive only two backup data from the 
group – each processor hence performs only one XOR during data backup, and (2) all 
groups work independently in parallel so that the needed data backup and recovery time 
is reduced to that for a single group. To compare the performance of our scheme and re-
lated schemes, we carry out extended simulation runs with results indicating improved 
survival counts, fault-tolerance ratios and computation overhead for our scheme.     
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The internet data transfer volumes have escalated at amazing speed due to rapid 
advances in information technology. To facilitate the processing of big data in cloud 
computing systems, data fault tolerance plays an important role. In cloud systems, when 
a processor turns faulty during transmission, existing checkpointing practices [1-19] can 
achieve fault tolerance by using alternative backup processors to ensure data correctness. 
Checkpointing practices may involve different time lengths for data backup and recovery 
due to different backup modes. For example, the Mutual-Aid Checkpointing scheme [9] 
employs mutual assistance to enhance data fault tolerance and improve traditional neigh- 
bor-based schemes. Its practice leads to a k/(2k+1) fault-tolerance ratio, where k is the 
number of failed processors. In [10], the Distributed Diskless Checkpointing scheme 
uses matrices to perform data-backup computation and matrix multiplication to recover 
data. It first multiplies the initial data B by a chosen matrix M to get the encoded check-
point C, C=M*B, and uses formula M-1*M*B = M-1*C to recover B when the processor 
storing B fails. The PSR scheme [11], on the other hand, uses processor ID distances to 
produce a Partial Sum Restricted (PSR) sequence whose elements cannot be duplicated 
and the sum of any two (or more than two) consecutive elements will not equal any sub-
sequent element. Based on such a PSR sequence, the scheme can recover a lost data item 
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immediately when encountering a faulty processor. 
When processors or tolerable faults increase in cloud systems, data recovery time 
for checkpointing schemes may grow significantly. To reduce the needed data backup 
volume and recovery time, we employ the group-based concept to form an efficient new 
diskless checkpointing backup scheme in this paper. We employ the group-based con-
cept to build the new scheme because it can practically trim down the overall data recov-
ery time. As observed, when processors are divided into groups in a system, all groups 
can process in parallel without interfering with each other. It indicates, when we divide 
processors into groups, we can engage data backup and recovery in all groups by the 
same time that a single group takes. That is, no matter how many groups are in the sys-
tem, we can always complete data backup and recovery by the same time for a single 
group. After close check, we realize a group with six processors can reach the best fault 
tolerance for group-based checkpointing practices. We hence decide to have six proces-
sors in a group and meanwhile allow each processor in a group to get only the backup 
data of two other processors in the same group. The design helps each processor obtain 
data backup in one XOR operation and enables the system to tolerate up to three faulty 
processors in a group of six, successfully lifting the fault-tolerance ratio to 3/6 or 50%. 
Extended simulation runs are conducted to check the performance of our group- 
based checkpointing scheme and related schemes. The collected results show that, 
among all target schemes, our new scheme yields notably improved performance in sur-
vival counts and fault-tolerance ratios. In addition to the performance gain, we mean-
while reduce the computation overhead for performing data backup and recovery in each 
processor, thanks to the adopted group-based concept. 
2. BACKGROUND STUDY 
Fault tolerance is of particular importance in cloud servers with massive data flow. 
To tolerate faults, previous mechanisms tend to put backup data in disks at the cost of 
extraordinary overhead. More recent mechanisms, the so-called diskless checkpointing 
approaches, choose to put backup data in memory to reduce the overhead. Checkpointing, 
an advanced tool to enhance data fault tolerance in cloud systems, can help recover the 
data of failed processors whenever failures happen. Its performance – the obtained fault 
tolerance ratio – depends on certain key factors: the degree and limit of fault tolerance, 
the tradeoff between cost and efficiency, and the required recovery time. Checkpointing 
approaches may store a backup data item in an exclusive processor or in the buffer of 
another processor. Storing a backup item in an exclusive processor may cause data un-
recoverable when the processor having the data and the exclusive processor with the 
backup data fail at the same time. By contrast, storing a backup item in the buffer of an-
other processor may turn over more enhanced fault tolerance ratios and be a better practice.  
In the following, we briefly introduce a few major checkpointing schemes to facili-
tate later discussions.  
2.1 The Mutual-Aid (MA) Checkpointing Scheme [9] 
The MA scheme is proposed for scenarios with more than five processors. It forms 
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processors into a ring in which each processor Pi contains its own backup data and a 
buffer with the backup data of two adjacent processors. For example, in Fig. 1 (a) which 
depicts a scenario with six processors (P1 to P6), MA will exclusive-OR the data of P1 
and P3, and store the result in the buffer of P2. Hence each processor will contain its own 
backup data (AS) and the backup data of two neighbor processors (PS), as Fig. 1 (b) 
shows. 
 
P1
P2
P3
P6
P5
P4
 
(a) The backup mechanism of MA. 
 
(b) Data recovery (cases 1 and 2). 
 
(c) Data recovery (case 3). 
Fig. 1. Illustration of the MA scheme. 
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P1 <P1 checkpoint> <P4 encoded checkpoint> 
P2 <P2 checkpoint> <P1 encoded checkpoint> 
P3 <P3 checkpoint> <P2 encoded checkpoint> 
P4 <P4 checkpoint> <P3 encoded checkpoint> 
Fig. 2. The contents of each processor in the DDC scheme. 
 
In this example, when a processor Pi fails, it can recover the data as follows. 
 
(1) Pi (say P3) can recover its data from XORing Pi-1’s (P2’s) PS and Pi-2’s (P1’s) AS (Fig. 
1 (b)). 
(2) Pi (say P4) can recover its data from XORing Pi+1’s (P5’s) PS and Pi+2’s (P6’s) AS 
(Fig. 1 (b)). 
(3) If Pi and Pi+2 fail simultaneously, Pi can recover its data by other processors. For in-
stance, when P2 and P4 both fail as in Fig. 1 (c), MA will perform indirect recovery: 
First XOR P5’s PS and P6’s AS to recover P4’s AS, and then XOR P3’s PS and re-
cover P4’s AS to recover the data of P2.  
(4) MA will not recover the data of Pi if three consecutive processors simultaneously fail. 
That is, if P2, P3 and P4 fail at the same time, MA will not recover the data of P3 be-
cause the PS to recover the data is stored in P2 or P4. 
 
2.2 The Distributed Diskless Checkpointing (DDC) Scheme [10] 
 
The DDC scheme lets a processor Pi use matrix multiplication to produce the 
backup data and store it in the buffer of processor Pi+1. That is, Pi holds its own backup 
data and the encoded backup data of Pi-1, as Fig. 2 illustrates. 
Based on the processor size, DDC will produce the matrix M with some mathemat-
ical properties to perform data backup and recovery. To generate m encoded checkpoints, 
it will produce a matrix with k+m rows and k columns –k depends on the checkpoint data 
size – to recover up to m failures, as the left side of Fig. 3 shows. The matrix will be di-
vided into k∗k (an identity matrix) and m∗k (a matrix M with some mathematical proper-
ties). The matrix size of the processor is k*1; the identity matrix I with the size k∗k is 
then generated. After performing matrix multiplication, DDC lets Pi store the produced 
encoded checkpoint data in the buffer of Pi+1, and maintains the original data by multi-
plying the identity matrix (k∗k) by the processor matrix (k*1) to keep the original Ch11~ 
Chk1 in the processor. Multiplying matrix M with the processor matrix will produce the 
encoded checkpoint data (C11~Cm1).  
When Pi fails, DCC can recover the data by the backup data stored in Pi+1. That is, 
it can work even when half of the processors fail, achieving as high as 50% fault toler-
ance ratios. It will, however, break down when two consecutive processors (say Pi and 
Pi+1) simultaneously fail as the data of Pi is beyond recovery if the buffer of Pi+1 is faulty. 
DDC actually performs data backup by using the inverse matrix of matrix M. Take Fig. 3 
as an example. When the processor storing B turns faulty, DDC will multiply the initial 
data B (processor matrix k*1–Ch11~Chk1) by matrix M (with size m*k) to get the encoded 
checkpoint C=M*B (with elements C11~Cm1) and use formula M-1*M*B = M-1*C to re-
cover B.  
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Fig. 3. Matrix multiplication for data backup in the DDC scheme. 
 
2.3 The Partial Sum Restricted (PSR) Scheme [11]  
 
The PSR scheme uses a partial sum restricted sequence rule to choose the interval 
distance for data backup and recovery. The rule restricts the interval distance number 
sequence in such a way that any two numbers cannot be the same and no number will 
equal the sum of any consecutive numbers. For example, to tolerate up to five failures, Pi 
will send the backup data to five specific processors which form four interval distances 
d0~d3. If d0~d3 is (2, 1, 9, 3), it breaks the PSR sequence rule; if (1, 3, 9, 6), it follows the 
rule. The purpose of the PSR sequence rule is to prevent the occurrence of duplicated 
data coverage. For instance, as P2 and P4 in Fig. 4 have the same data coverage proces-
sors P0 and P1, the failures of P0 and P1 become intolerable. That is, PSR cannot recover 
the lost data when a sequence breaks the rule. 
 
 
Fig. 4. Failed data recovery (not following the PSR sequence rule). 
 
 
Fig. 5. Successful data recovery (following the PSR sequence rule). 
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As mentioned, to tolerate up to k processor failures, PSR must have each processor 
(say Pi) send data to k specific processors whose IDs belong to processor ID set CSi 
which includes Pi’s checkpoint storage nodes and meanwhile receive data from k pro-
cessors whose IDs belong to processor ID set CCi which includes Pi’s checkpoint cov-
erage nodes. After receiving data from different processors, Pi will XOR the received 
data and store it in the buffer. Each processor hence has its CS and CC – formed by the 
PSR sequence rule – for data backup and recovery. Figs. 4 and 5 exhibit how PSR works 
or not works. Fig. 4 gives a case with five processors to tolerate up to 2 processor fail-
ures. We see that when P0 and P1 – both sending data to P2 and P4 – fail, PSR cannot use 
the data of P1 to recover the data of P0, i.e., P0 is unrecoverable. When the sequence rule 
has been observed as in the case in Fig. 5, PSR will succeed in recovering the data. 
3. THE PROPOSED SCHEME 
For existing checkpointing schemes, data recovery time may grow significantly 
with the increase of processor numbers or tolerable faults. To facilitate data recovery, i.e., 
to reduce the required data backup volume and recovery time, when processor failures 
happen, we employ a group-based concept to set up a new and efficient diskless check-
pointing scheme for cloud computing systems. In our new scheme, we put six proces-
sors – each with an ID number – in a group and let each processor (say Pi) send data to 
two other processors (say Pi+2 and Pi+3) in the group. Each processor hence takes one 
XOR operation to backup its data, as Fig. 6 shows. When Pi fails, the design can always 
help recover its data (stored in the buffers of Pi+2 and Pi+3) unless three consecutive pro-
cessors Pi, Pi+2 and Pi+3 fail simultaneously – which is a rare case. Excluding the rare 
case, we can constantly restore the data lost due to processor failures even when three 
failures occur in the group. That is, we can tolerate up to three processor failures in a 
group, achieving a very satisfactory 3/6 or equivalently 50% fault tolerance ratio. 
Fig. 6 gives as an example to illustrate our scheme. When P0, P1 and P3 fail at the 
same time, we can respectively recover the data in P0 by P2 and P5, the data in P1 by P4 
and P2, and the data in P3 by P5 and P2. Note that the three recovery operations can be 
performed in parallel and take only one XOR, i.e., they can be completed in one step. 
Even when the rare case of three consecutive processor failures happen, we can also re-
store the data – not in one but in three XORs (three times of XOR). In such a rare case, 
we need three steps to complete the data recovery: (1) recover the data in one failed pro-
cessor, (2) recover the data in another failed processor by the recovered data in (1), and 
(3) recover the data in the last failed processor by the recovered data in (2). For example, 
if the three consecutive processors P0, P1 and P2 fail at the same time, we will (1) use P3 
and P5 to recover the data in P2, (2) use P2 and P4 to recover the data in P1, and (3) use 
P1 and P3 to recover the data in P0. This example also reveals that, in face of three consecu-
tive processor failures, we need at least six processors in a group to recover the lost data.  
Note that we do not consider increasing the group processor amount (to over six) in 
order to tolerate more than three processor failures in a group because we let each pro-
cessor send data to only two member processors in the group and will never recover the 
data of Pi when four consecutive processors Pi, Pi+1, Pi+2 and Pi+3 fail simultaneously – 
no matter how many processors are in the group, we always need the backup data in Pi+2 
or Pi+3 to recover the data of Pi. The fact explicitly explains our choice of setting six 
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Fig. 6. An example group in our group-based scheme. 
 
processors in a group. 
Except for the specified rare case, our scheme can always recover the lost data at 
one XOR time. It can save significant data recovery time when the system has a large 
number of processors. The scheme is also advantageous in that its groups operate inde-
pendently so that the failure in one group will not affect the performance of other groups. 
For instance, when a group in the system suffers four processor failures and is incapable 
of practicing data recovery, the other groups remain unaffected. The feature that all 
groups process in parallel and are free of mutual interference enables our scheme to yield 
the same performance regardless of the number of processors in the system. That is, no 
matter how many groups exist in the system, our scheme will constantly take the same 
data backup and recovery time as if there exists only one group.  
For better illustration, please refer to the flowchart of our scheme in Fig. 7 and also 
the comparison among the schemes in Table 1. 
 
Table 1. Comparison among various schemes. 
Schemes 
Backup and 
recovery 
operation 
Sending the 
data of Pi to
Pi receives 
data from 
Processors 
in groups
Parallel 
backup, 
recovery 
Intolerable 
minimum 
failures 
MA XOR Pi-1, Pi+1 Pi-1, Pi+1 No No 
Three con-
secutive 
failures 
DDC Matrix mul-tiplication 
Pi+1 
(encoded) 
Pi-1 
(encoded) No No 
Two con-
secutive 
failures 
PSR XOR k processors (PSR rule)
k processors 
(PSR rule) No No 
k + 1  
failures 
Group-based XOR Pi+2, Pi+3 Pi-2, Pi-3 
Yes 
(group of 6)
Yes (All 
groups 
process in 
parallel) 
Four con-
secutive 
failures in 
a group 
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Fig. 8. Survival counts for various schemes. 
 
Fig. 7. The flowchart of our group-based scheme. 
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4. SIMULATION RESULTS 
As mentioned, we build our group-based data backup and recovery scheme to pur-
sue more desirable performance than related schemes. In this section, we carry out ex-
tensive simulation runs to collect the results of survival counts, fault-tolerance ratios and 
recovery time for performance comparisons between our group-based scheme and other 
checkpointing schemes, including MA, DDC and PSR. The three indexes actually reveal 
the performance and cost of the four target schemes and also the pros and cons of their 
designs. To be more specific, survival counts and fault tolerance ratios are proper indi-
cators for their data backup and recovery practices, and recovery time (which exhibits 
how fast the schemes recover the data) indicates the required cost.  
 
4.1 Survival Counts vs. Maximum Numbers of Failures 
 
In this simulation, we evaluate and compare the survival counts for our scheme and 
related schemes, including MA, DDC and PSR, in a network of 50 processors with uni-
formly distributed failed processors. The numbers of failed processors are uniformly 
distributed random numbers between 1 and the assumed maximum numbers 10, 15, 20 
and 25 in the x-axis. Considering the bandwidth, operation speed and data size involved 
in the recovery, we assume a one-second delay for each scheme to recover the data of a 
failed processor. In the special case when one processor P1 fails, needs another processor 
P2 to recover the data but finds P2 turns faulty in the next second, we assume P1’s data is 
unrecoverable, i.e., no survival count will be added. Fig. 8 depicts the survival counts 
collected in the simulation for all schemes. As it shows, our group-based scheme yields 
more survival counts than other schemes, thanks to its feature design which can tolerate 
as many as three processor failures in a group of six processors to reach up to 3/6 fault 
tolerance ratios. 
 
4.2 Fault Tolerance Ratios vs. Processor MTBF 
 
Mean Time between Failures (MTBF) and reliability are often taken to depict pro-
cessor performance. MTBF can actually be taken as an attribute or measure of hardware 
and software reliability [20]. It decides processor durability. For a repairable system, it 
indicates the average time between two consecutive processor failures, which is a proper 
performance parameter for system reliability and maintainability because the longer 
MTBF is, the more durable processors will be or the less likely they will fail. We there-
fore use MTBF to estimate fault tolerance ratios in this simulation. Fig. 9 gives the re-
sults of fault-tolerance ratios vs. processor MTBF. We assume the system has 100 pro-
cessors and set the range of MTBF between 100 and 450 to see how it affects the fault 
tolerance ratios of different schemes (PSR is excluded from the evaluation because it 
cannot tolerate any failure under the assumed MTBF range.) The result in Fig. 9 exhibits 
clearly that fault tolerance ratios of each scheme grow with increased MTBF values. 
Among the schemes, DDC yields constantly the lowest ratios due to its “more stringent” 
conditions for fault tolerance. Our group-based scheme, by contrast, has “looser” condi-
tions for fault tolerance and thus generates much higher ratios at any MTBF value. 
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4.3 Recovery Time Comparisons 
 
Processor failure rates tend to grow after certain execution time. If we can restore 
the data lost upon processor failures as soon as possible, we may enhance system relia-
bility significantly. This makes the following recovery time comparisons between 
schemes interesting and meaningful.  
 
 
Fig. 9. Fault-tolerance ratios vs. processor MTBF for various schemes. 
 
 
Fig. 10. Recovery time comparisons among schemes. 
 
In PSR, the maximum tolerable failures will decide the number of XOR operations. 
In general, if the maximum tolerable failures are k, each processor buffer must store the 
data from k processors which will be combined into one by k–1 XOR operations. For 
example, when the maximum tolerable failures are two, PSR needs one XOR because 
each processor buffer stores the data from two other processors which can be combined 
into one by one XOR operation. For our new scheme and MA, each processor buffer will 
store only the data of two other processors, regardless of the maximum tolerable failures. 
That is, in all situations, both schemes will take only one XOR to combine the data. 
Fig. 10 gives recovery time for different schemes. The numbers of failed processors 
in the x-axis are randomly generated. We assume that the data size of each processor is 
1T bytes, the XOR rate is 10G Hz and the bandwidth is 10G bytes.  
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When the number of failed processors grows in the system, the result depicts sig-
nificant rising recovery time for PSR but negligible rising time for our scheme and MA. 
The result is expectable because, no matter how many processor failures the system en-
dures, our scheme and MA need only one XOR to achieve data recovery, whereas PSR 
needs k–1 XOR operations to accomplish the same job when facing k failed processors. 
It is also observed that, if the number of failed processors is fixed and we list increasing 
data sizes (instead of failed processors) in the x-axis, the schemes will yield similar 
trends of recovery time as in Fig. 10. That is, when data sizes grow, PSR also needs 
more XOR operations and more recovery time to achieve data recovery, in contrast to 
our scheme and MA. Note that MA performs as well as our group-based scheme in re-
covery time evaluation, but it trails behind us in fault tolerance ratios and survival 
counts. 
 
4.4 The “Leftover” Processors Which Fail to Form a Group 
 
By “leftover” processors, we indicate those processors whose number is below six 
and therefore insufficient to form a new group. To cover these processors in our opera-
tion, we put them into a special group and use the following counter measures to practice 
data backup and recovery.  
 
(1) If there is only one leftover processor, the processor will be unrecoverable if it fails. 
(2) If there are two leftover processors, they will back up each other’s data. When one 
fails, we can recover the data by the other; if both fail, they become unrecoverable. 
(3) If there are three leftover processors, the data of each processor will be stored in the 
other two. When one processor fails, the data can be recovered; when two fail simul-
taneously, they are unrecoverable.  
(4) With four leftover processors, the data of each processor (say Pi) can be stored in two 
other processors (say Pi+2 and Pi+3). If two processors with no consecutive ID num-
bers fail, we can still recover the data.  
(5) With five leftover processors, we can back up the data of Pi in two other processors 
Pi+2 and Pi+3 and, when any two processors fail, we can always recover the data.  
 
We carry out the simulation under the same environment specified above, except 
that the reliability is set at 0.8 and the numbers of processors are not multiples of six. Fig. 
11 plots the results. It shows that, in systems with 12+n, 18+n, … and 54+n processors 
(n is a randomly generated number between 1 and 5), our group-based scheme also out-
performs DDC and MA in fault-tolerance ratios.  
As mentioned, with six processors in a group, our scheme can obtain up to 3/6 fault 
tolerance ratios. With five processors in a group, it is easy to derive that the fault toler-
ance ratio will be 2/5. It makes the total fault tolerance ratio (for the two groups) = 
(3+2)/(6+5) = 5/11. Instead of putting the leftover processors into a new group, we can 
merge them into any existing group of six processors to form a special group of more 
than six processors. For example, we can merge 5 leftover processors into an existing 
group to form a group of 11 processors and derive the fault tolerance ratio to be 6/11 (in 
one merged group), which is better than 5/11 (in two individual groups). In fact, we have 
analyzed and simulated the fault tolerance ratios with different numbers of leftover pro-
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cessors for two situations: forming an individual new group or merged into an existing 
group. The results in Table 2 and Fig. 12 indicate overall better fault tolerance ratios for 
merged groups, regardless of the leftover numbers. It reveals that merging the leftover 
processors into an existing group is a better counter measure and right choice for our 
scheme. 
 
Table 2. Fault-tolerance ratios with different leftover processors. 
leftover processors in an individual group merged into another group 
1 3/7 4/7 
2 4/8 4/8 
3 4/9 5/9 
4 5/10 5/10 
5 5/11 6/11 
 
 
 
Fig. 11. Fault-tolerance ratios vs. numbers of processors not multiples of six. 
 
Fig. 12. Fault tolerance ratios vs. numbers of processors not multiples of six. 
 
4.5 Other Discussions 
 
In developing a new checkpointing scheme to outperform existing schemes, we put 
our focus on finding a better way to backup processor data and then use the backup data 
to recover the data lost due to processors failures. The above simulation results show that 
we have successfully built such a desired data backup and recovery scheme which ad-
vances related schemes in both performance and cost. More specifically, the obtained 
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higher survival counts and fault-tolerance ratios exhibit our performance gain in data 
backup and recovery practices, and the lower recovery time indicates we can recover the 
lost data faster, i.e., with less cost. Our simulation does not include memory cost or 
communication cost because they are hardly involved in the evaluation of related 
schemes. If the two costs are included, we can expect they will be less for our scheme 
than for others due to the feature that we let each processor send data to only two other 
processors in the group.  
As mentioned previously, data backup and recovery remains a critical issue in cloud 
computing systems. We observe that a number of new data backup and recovery 
schemes, such as [21-24], have been recently proposed to enhance the performance and 
efficiency of data backup and recovery in cloud systems. Among the schemes, some 
performs user authentication based on attributes and secret keys to secure data backup 
and recovery from the remote cloud server [21]. Some adopt cost effective filtration 
schemes to further reduce the required complexity and overheads, and meanwhile 
achieve faster remote recovery [22, 23]. They achieve the goal by eliminating redundan-
cy and compressing similarity of data to transmit massive data in a more efficient way 
between long-distance data centers. There are also schemes (e.g., [24]) which employ 
optimization data scheduling strategies to schedule data backup in order to balance such 
data recovery objectives as high data reliability, low backup cost and short recovery time. 
By doing so, they can reduce data backup cost and recovery time as much as possible. 
The above schemes, as we can see, attempt to tackle the data backup and recovery issue 
in cloud computing by different approaches. The fact reveals the importance of the topic 
and also the rich variety of possible solutions. We believe that, if these schemes are 
brought to work together with our group-based scheme, we will be able to further en-
hance both the performance and efficiency of data backup and recovery in cloud compu-
ting systems. 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
Data fault tolerance is critical for cloud computing systems with massive data vol-
umes. When processor failures occur in the system, a checkpointing recovery mechanism 
can restore the lost data by alternative backup processors, to maintain data correctness 
and system performance. However, when processors or tolerable faults grow in the sys-
tem, checkpointing approaches may require significant time to accomplish the data re-
covery task. Our research goal is to build an efficient group-based data backup and re-
covery scheme able to reduce data backup volumes and recovery time. The new scheme 
is built over two observations: (1) a group of six processors can attain optimal fault tol-
erance for group-based checkpointing practices and (2) all groups in a system can pro-
cess in parallel without inter-influence. We hence involve a group-based concept to form 
the new diskless checkpointing scheme, in which each group contains six processors and 
each processor sends data to two member processors. By allowing a processor to receive 
only two backup data from two member processors, we enable each processor to attain 
backup data by a single XOR operation. The design helps us tolerate up to three faulty 
processors in a group of six processors, elevating fault tolerance ratios to as high as 3/6 
or 50%. Extensive simulation runs have been conducted to evaluate the performance of 
our group-based data recovery scheme and related schemes. The results show that, in 
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contrast to other schemes, ours yields significantly better performance in survival counts 
and fault tolerance ratios. When performing the efficient data backup and recovery, we 
also succeed in reducing the computation overhead (which is big in existing schemes) in 
each processor. We notice that each data backup and recovery scheme may face the 
memory competition problem, such as the impact of memory competition from diskless 
checkpoints on the execution of applications.  We consider memory competition a sig-
nificant and interesting issue worth our further investigation in the future.   
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